Jeremy's Den: Which Side Are They On?

I dislike and distrust the English

If England is still ruling the world, it is due to the stupidity

Of other countries which allow themselves to be bluffed

(Josef Stalin, 1939)

The two sides of liberty’s golden coin are a two-for-one

Ice cream Snickers bar and a copy of Private Eye

(Boris Johnson, 2016)

Have the Conservatives totally lost the plot? Did they genuinely expect the Aukus thing to go away because it suits them? Now it has become an issue in the French presidential campaign, as it was really delusional to think the right-wing candidates would not try and use it against Emmanuel Macron. Which in turn can only prompt France to show some more muscle and tell the UK what a miserable lot they are. Did they really expect nobody would see through their feeble excuses for the shortage of lorry drivers and widespread shortages of all sorts of goods? Surely they did, don't put that level of stupidity past them, but they don't give a fuck as long as enough voters are deluded enough to keep them ahead in poll after poll. And even Swindon's Swinging Roundabout won't make a fucking difference. You can also argue that polls show that the electorate is highly volatile, and that polls conducted now, when we don't even know when the next election will be held, mean fuck all. And I would counter that people answer these polls with the implicit subtext that it's all about an election happening next Thursday, and more and more polls are actually explicitly worded that way. Now, with all this and Chevening too, your gut probably tells you that the gap in voting intentions, between the Conservatives and Labour, should have narrowed. Alas, poor voters, in Real Life As We Know It Outwith SW1, the trend of polls says it has actually widened, if only by a teeny weeny smitch.

Many in the "progressive" media speculate about a reboot of the Winter Of Discontent, complete with power cuts and shortages across the board. But Number Ten's Press Corps have undoubtedly already come up with the magic trick that will make everyone happy. Boris will not call it a three-day-week, he will call it a four-day-weekend, and make it sound more progressive and working-class-oriented than anything that came out of the Labour conference. The Guardian might get their hopes high about some sort of fin de règne mood at the Conservative conference, but it will take much more than that to topple the Conservative majority in Commons. Then we have this Twitter pile-on from Owen Jones and Jones Owen, eager to convince us that Labour under Starmer would come third in a two-way race. Which of course is just another episode of the never-ending saga of "The Useful Idiots Of Borisism". The German Communists in 1932 were also obsessed with ideological purity, and picked the Social-Democrats as their class enemy of choice. Then they had all the time in the world to sort out their quarrel, when the Nazis indiscriminately sent them all to Dachau a year later. Keir Starmer's spads should also keep an eye on what polls say about voting intentions in England Outwith The M25, where all hopes of a future Labour government come to die. There too, the Conservatives' lead over Labour has sightly increased in the most recent polls. Despite the shortage of honey at Waitrose's. Go figure.

Of course, there is no magic trick that would make Labour's chances at an election win better. Except perhaps becoming an opposition party. One can dream. Bear in mind that Labour would need to gain back all seats they lost in England last time aboot, if they want to deny the Conservatives a majority. And even this would leave the Conservatives as the first party by a wide margin, and with enough seats to go on as a minority government, gambling on the oppositions' inability to build a united front. Just think 2017-2019 without May's bumbling and tumbling, and Bozo aided and abetted by bland Labour leadership. What remains to be seen is how the Covid Report, about the English Government's criminal mismanagement of the early pandemic, will impact the Conservatives' electoral prospects. Outwith the SW1 bubble, actions have consequences but, sadly, it's likely the report, however damning it is, will have none.

When you reach your Everest and you peak, you have to keep going

(Gareth Thomas, Richard Osman’s House Of Games, 2021)

The point of modern propaganda isn’t only to misinform or push an agenda

It is to exhaust your critical thinking, to annihilate truth

(Garry Kasparov)

You can't say Boris Johnson does not have a moral compass. His only problem is that it points whichever the way the wind blows. Which might explain why he is still doing so well in the Preferred First Minister of England polls. I'm not ruling out something here similar to the "9/11 Effect" in the USA, when people thought "Thanks God it's George Bush in charge, and not Al Gore", and The Shrub's ratings skyrocketed. Or it might be the SW1 Variant of the SNP's favourite campaign slogan, "at least we're not as bad as the other lot". Not sure that Keir's new pamphlet will help much here, as it quacks and walks like A Study In Beige, just like what is supposed to be his best pitch for it in The Guardian. Then we have Peter Mandelson advising Keir to be a bit of Attlee, a bit of Wilson and a bit of Blair. Which could be an interesting exercise in squaring the circle, but won't leave Labour's target voters any the wiser. Now there's truth in one thing Lord Pete says, that these voters are "volatile and capable of turning to an alternative". Which is exactly what the polls say and, unfortunately for New New Labour, that alternative is Bozo.

Since The Reshuffle To End All Reshuffles, aka The Night Of The Long Wets, Boris has been triumphant in his world-beating unchallenged glory. It's quite embarrassing to see that Keir Starmer is still unable to mount a credible challenge, and prefers triggering yet another internecine feud within Labour, and then backpedals to the starting point under pressure, when there are already so many irrelevant rifts within the party, more on those later. It is also quite flabbergasting that Keir fails to see the obvious. That an attempt at tweaking the rules, to make a leadership challenge more difficult, will also make it more likely. Unless lefty activists choose to desert Labour in droves, and set up their own small business on the fringes, which may actually be the plan. Whichever it is, it does not have "success" written all over it. But there is another explanation to Sly Keir's unconvincing performance. Survation recently polled the public's perception of Boris, Keir, their parties and the government's performance. As is often the case with this kind of question, the results are quite astonishing.

This one is like an episode of QI, where everyone gets negative points at the end. Here Boris does best with a net -5, and Keir does worst with a net -12. The assessment of the Conservative Party and the Government's performance are fairly similar, if you compare the totals of positives and negatives. One of the rare occurrences where's there a semblance of consistency in a poll's findings. In the same poll, Survation found the Conservatives on 40% of voting intentions and Labour on 35%. Which is the same as the total of favourables for Boris Johnson and the Labour Party respectively. The interesting part is that Boris scores 3% higher than the Conservative Party on favourables, while Keir scores 4% lower than Labour. Which means that Bozo boosts the Tory vote, and their success in polls owes a lot to personal factors. While Keir is more likely to drag Labour down, again because of personal factors. There is definitely a lot of irony in someone who is a pathological liar and can't get anything done without fucking it up becoming an asset, when someone who is just bland, indecisive and contradictory ends up being a major liability. This is even more worrying for Labour when you factor in that Johnson is still the Master Of Time. He can call a snap election at his convenience, even with the Fixed Term Parliaments Act still in force. He has done it once, on well-intentioned tips from the Liberal Democrats and the SNP, so he can do it again. And here Starmer ends, not with a bang but with a whimper.

In a world that’s so full of anxiety, violence and misery

I truly believe that music is the one thing we can all use

To drown out the screams of people we don’t care about

(Jimmy Carr, The Big Fat Quiz Of Everything, 2021)

I was in a band once, and we were utterly, utterly dreadful

We were terrible but we had a great time, which sort of sums up my life

(Tim Farron, Have I Got News For You, 2016)

It's always fun to watch where the Liberal Democrats stand at any point in time and space. We haven't quite reached the "blow jobs for votes" stage, but I expect that one to come up soon. When even The Guardian, who would like you to forget they once endorsed the LibDems, openly make fun of them, then it's time for some innovative campaigning, innit? It's less fun, admittedly, to watch Labour allowing themselves to be manipulated by extremist keyboard warriors, and letting "trans rights" become the dominant issue ahead of their conference. Then you have to wonder why the pronoun cultists suddenly drop their proverbial "no debate" policy, and demand a debate on an issue that's so far away from the real concerns of real people. Which also demonstrates that this lot, who self-identify as "socialists", have never read the works of Gramsci, or they would understand the concept of "working class culture", and not stray into ideological avenues that are a pressing issue only for a tiny clique of metropolitan intellectuals and over-age students. But right now they're just the "useful idiots of Borisism", as everything they do weakens Labour, and strengthens the GB News narrative about "out of touch woke Marxists". Quite expectedly, the Labour conference was not the unmitigated success Keir Starmer hoped and needed. The Observer did not find any signs of a post-conference bounce, and the full sequence of later polls confirms it. There's not enough in them to make Labour look truly competitive again, as my current Poll'O'Polls shows. It includes the last three published polls, fielded between 25 and 29 October. Super-sample size is 5,700 with a theoretical margin of error of 1.3%.

So far, nine polls have been conducted after the horrific murder of Sir David Amess MP, and tend to show it did not have much influence on voting intentions. Differences with the polls conducted on the week before the murder are marginal and statistically insignificant. Part of the explanation might be that none of the major politicians tried to score cheap political points here, most noticeably Boris Johnson, who sounded and looked genuinely shocked when he made an unusually restrained statement some hours after the murder. The only exception was Priti Patel, who was quick to promote some conspiracy theory about "bedroom radicals" spontaneously generated by lockdowns, and talk about toughening legislation about online communication. While nobody will deny the increase of hate speech and abuse on social media, and the necessity to tackle it, Patel once again appeared coldly and shamelessly opportunistic. Then it's safe to assume she doesn't give a rat's fuck about that, as long as she can push legislation that suits the radical right-wingers within the Conservative party. What the current snapshot of polls says is that's back pretty much where we were early in September, after a short-lived improvement for Labour mid-September. As with earlier snapshots, we don't have Labour doing spectacularly better, as they're only 2% up on their 2019 result. But mostly the Conservatives doing badly as they're now 5% down on 2019. As usual too, this hides more complex transfers from one party to the other, as the Greens are also doing pretty well. Even in places where you wouldn't expect them to, as the breakdown of projected votes by nation and region shows.

Again Labour are making progress in the Midlands, and even more so in the Leafy South. While they are definitely struggling in the North and in Scotland, but this time it doesn't help the SNP, who are down a bit. More surprisingly and against the GB-wide trends, the Labour vote is also noticeably down in Wales and London. In this context, I don't have any high hopes about the by-election in Old Bexley and Sidcup, that was triggered by James Brokenshire's untimely death. Some are already fantasising about it being Chesham and Amersham 2.0, but I don't see any genuine similarities between the two. Other than both, and their predecessor seats, having been solidly Conservative from 1950 to 2019. But current polls predict very little change in the Imperial Capital and, if anything, Labour might actually lose votes there to the Greens. While, already in June, the same polls predicted a significant Conservative slump in the Inner Commuter Belt. And the factors that might have helped the LibDems in C&A, like Blue Nimbyism, are definitely more relevant in the Outer Commuter Belt, not within Greater London. What happens inside the M25 definitely has a life of its own, and it doesn't match the patterns outwith it. Furthermore, the Conservatives held OB&S with a 41% lead in December 2019, while they led by "only" 29% in C&A. On top of all that, the main opposition in OB&S is Labour, while it was the Liberal Democrats in C&A, and Keir Starmer's poor image with the electorate makes a 25% swing to Labour highly unlikely in OB&S.

I tell this joke sometimes when I’m on stage

Jeremy Corbyn is the kind of guy that will go soft

While you’re having sex with him

And blame you for the fact that he’s lost the erection

(Grace Campbell, As Yet Untitled: I Scribbled On The Other Breast, 2021)

This elderly woman in the front row, she came up to me afterwards

And she said, I have this to say, I’m a big fan of Jeremy Corbyn

And I think he is the kind of guy who would go soft

And then finger you till completion

(Grace Campbell, As Yet Untitled: I Scribbled On The Other Breast, 2021)

My model says that the Conservatives would be down to a 21-seat working majority on current polling, assuming Sinn Féin bag the same number of seats and still don't take them. Other projection models are slightly less favourable to the Conservatives. They credit them with 328-329 seats, with Labour on 236-241, the SNP on 47-49 and the Liberal Democrats on 9-14. Which is clearly within the margin of uncertainty for any projection, and still means the Conservatives would cling to power on a sharply reduced majority. It's the not-so-unprecedented situation where it has got better for Labour, before getting worse again, and possibly getting better at some point in the distant future. But, for now, Keir Starmer is still further away from the £2.6m briefing room than Jeremy Corbyn was in 2017. Well, maybe he will get there in time for the first post-Craig James Bond movie. But I'm not even sure that the Conservatives turning rivers into open-air sewers because, ye ken, doing otherwise would be bad for business, is enough of a shocker to turn the tide. But some Conservative MPs seem to have been flooded with complaints from their constituents, so the English Government have watered down their approach. Though it's not really the trademark Borisian handbrake U-turn, but more like a reluctant L-turn.

The LibDems might pat themselves on the back for their supposed ability to gain Winchester, but it does not change the big picture. And they even got that one wrong as their only projected gain in England outwith London is South Cambridgeshire, which would just make up for losing Tim Farron's seat in Westmoreland and Lonsdale. Chesham and Amersham, their much celebrated by-election gain, would also return to the Conservatives under the voting patterns of a general election. From Labour's point of view, the good news is that they're projected to do as well as in 2017 in the Midlands and much better in the Leafy Nimby South. The bad news is that they're still 26 seats down on 2017 in the North, losing some ground in supposedly safe Wales, and in a quite ambiguous situation in London, where they would bag one more seat while losing votes. What this also proves is that votes for the Green Party of England and Wales are wasted votes, except in Brighton and Bristol. And don't jump to the conclusion that it makes the case for some variant of proportional representation, as it doesn't. Don't even mention Germany (more on that later, by the way) as the voting patterns under PR there are the result of 72 years of practice, and of a political culture that values consensus over confrontation, not something that happened overnight because somebody thought it cute and clever to change the electoral law. And also remember that what Labour need is at least a return to 2005, not 2017, and we're still a million miles away from that.

In case you wonder, three Scottish seats would change hands on current polling. Gordon from the SNP to the Conservatives. Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath from the SNP to Labour. Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross from the Liberal Democrats to the SNP. This polling also has the Conservatives just one hare's breath away from another gain in Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock. With the SNP's vote again eroding, you never know what might happen next, especially as the Commons polls don't factor in the Alba Party yet, so more upsets might be in the making. Quite obviously, the SNP's mediocre performance in recent polls has to do with their Fake Crime and Public Inquisition Act, which was rushed through Holyrood before the last election, and is now being delayed for no clear reason. Except perhaps the Scottish Government struggling to find a way to amend it, and making it less of a Stonewall Act, without totally losing face. And also avoiding dick-in-your-face activists calling the SNP "a hub of transphobia" because the party would acknowledge that sex is a fact, and facts trump perceptions and feelings. But surely something is slowly moving in Scotland, when the usually SNP-cuddling and Stonewall-compliant National open their columns to a reader's letter directly blaming their gender self-identification obsession for him leaving the SNP. The times they are a-changin' and the tide is turning, as shown by this week's poll where only 20% of Scots and 29% of SNP voters support the Stonewall option of gender self-identification. Unfortunately, by some domino effect, this is not making the chances of Scottish Independence any better, more on this later too.

You can talk all you want about "building back better"

But if you're not actually going to do anything

It's just another empty Boris catchphrase like "levelling up"

Or "of course I will pay child support"

(Ahir Shah, Late Night Mash, 2021)

What is the point in getting an education at all?

I know how to use the apostrophe

Apparently, now it doesn’t matter

What I want, I want the time it took me to learn that back

(David Mitchell, QI: Lumped Together, 2014)

This year's Conference Season was an oven-ready opportunity for pollsters to scrutinise the electorate's feelings about the various political parties. Something they missed last year with the Lockdown Conferences, and was seen as relevant this year, as the Labour Conference was widely seen as defining "make or break" moment for Keir Starmer. Spoiler alert: it neither made him nor broke him, though post-Conference polling shows he missed the opportunity to truly redefine himself as a charismatic Leader Of The Opposition. First item here is how the general public and the subset of Labour voters rate Sly Keir on some select items that might define his PM-ability. It's quite a mixed bag from the general public, though not as bad as Keir's adversaries would like us to think. The really worrying part for Keir is that even Labour voters don't think he is strong, whatever that actually means. I guess "decisive" or "standing up for his beliefs under pressure" do qualify, and these are definitely not Keir's fortes. Not sure, though, that it does disqualify him from the Downing Street job, as some former PMs were not really good at it either. And don't even get me started about the current one.

Opinium also tested the electorate's assessment of hypothetical government coalitions. With a wording that let all options open as it said "Do you think it would be acceptable or unacceptable for one of the main parties to form a coalition with...?", in the event of a hung Parliament after the incoming snap election. Respondents could project pretty much what they want on such a wording, and they obviously did. Labour voters are lukewarm about an hypothetical alliance with the SNP, while SNP voters convincingly endorse it. The real question here is obviously what the SNP could achieve from such an alliance. Quite possibly a stunt like the Con-Lib deal about Alternative Voting in 2011. It's quite easy to imagine Labour agreeing to a second Independence Referendum on the SNP's terms, then actively campaigning for No, like David Cameron did over AV. And then using a narrow defeat for Yes as grounds to rule out another referendum for a couple of generations. Then both Labour and Green voters massively support an alliance between their parties. The only problem here is that it would serve no practical purpose, such as an increased majority, under current voting patterns and FPTP. Simply because the seats that the Greens could gain if Labour stood down, are the same that Labour could gain if the Greens stood down. And there are just a handful of them anyway, so nothing that would conclusively swing the balance of power in Commons.

The response from LibDem voters is more ambiguous, as the question covered both a coalition with the Conservatives and one with Labour. All they genuinely say is that they would strongly approve the LibDems returning to power, and probably no matter whom with. Let's take that though as favourable to a coalition with Labour, which is certainly what a majority of them mean. The position of the SNP and Green voters is far less ambiguous, as obviously none of them would support a coalition with the Conservatives. Or would they? So we have pretty much a massive approval of a "traffic light" coalition of the kind currently in the making in Germany. More on that later. The massive irony here is that such a coalition, based on hypothetical "compromise", is just what the supporters of PR advocate. And it would be made not just possible, but also necessary, by FPTP.

Have you done the thing, when you can’t find your phone, so you ring it

And then you realise you’re ringing from the phone you’re looking for?

And it doesn’t help because it’s engaged

(Alan Davies, QI: Naked Truth, 2016)

You’ve got a lot to look forward to, you know

A normal human life, mortgage repayments, the nine to five,

A persistent nagging sense of spiritual emptiness

Save the tears for later, boyo

(The Doctor, Doctor Who: Closing Time, 2011)

In the run-up to the conferences, Savanta Comres surveyed the electorate's perception of the various political parties on offer. This is how the voters of each party rate their own party of choice on the proverbial left-to-right scale, excluding "don't know" answers. Interestingly, the first choice is always "Centrist", even by only a wee margin. If I was a registered psychologist, I would venture that many people don't want to self-identify as extremists, in whichever direction, so "Centrist" is a natural first choice. But I am not, so I will not. Then there is an indisputable logic in a majority of LibDem and SNP voters describing their preferred party as centrist, as this is actually what they are. Then the real surprise is that fewer Reform UK or UKIP voters define their parties as right-wing than Conservative voters. Maybe we should pin that one on former Labour voters, who switched some time in the last couple of years, and haven't yet realised that there is nothing centrist or leftist in supporting a hard Brexit and English nationalism.

There is an interesting mirror-effect here between the voters of the two main parties. 15% of Conservative voters see the Conservatives as left-wing, 31% as centrists, 43% as right-wing and 11% don't know. While 44% of Labour voters see Labour as left-wing, 35% as centrists, 10% as right-wing and 11% don't know. My only caveat here is that we don't know how the respondents self-identify on the left-to-right scale, which would shed a different light on how they see the different parties. Voting intentions are just a partial hint, as there is a wealth of evidence that whom you vote for can be at odds with how you define yourself. And I don't even factor in potential tactical voting here. Savanta Comres also surveyed peoples' assessment of the various part being "too lefty" or "too righty". Again the really interesting part is their crosstab with voting intentions, reflecting what voters think about their party of choice. There is quite a consensus from all voters, to say their preferred party is about right on that scale. Probably most people don't want to be caught contradicting themselves.

Notably outwith the consensus are Labour voters, with only half thinking their party is about right, and one quarter each assessing it as too righty or too lefty. Paradoxically this might actually help Keir Starmer, claiming he has the support of three quarters of Labour voters in his quest to eradicate the Corbynistas. Who could in turn argue that Starmer is shamelessly culling a quarter of the party, who think it has veered too far to the right. Another round of pretty useless debates that will ultimately help nobody. But surely all the Useful Idiots of Borisism would relish in that like piggies in a mud bath. Interestingly, the run-up to the conference was also the moment The Times chose to publish long and eye-watering interviews of Angela Rayner and Wes Streeting. Just as if there's something in the brewing in some witches' cauldron somewhere, and we failed to see it.

I never ask visitors to take their shoes off, because I hate that when

I go to someone else’s house and they make you take your shoes off

I think it’s ridiculous. I don’t know what’s on your carpet, do I?

(Jon Richardson, 8 Out Of Ten Cats Does Countdown, 2021)

But I do ask people to take their glasses off when they come into my house

I find it rude, I think it’s an insult to my hosting, implying that

I’m gonna hide stuff or not help you up the stairs

(Jon Richardson, 8 Out Of Ten Cats Does Countdown, 2021)

Meanwhile, North Of The Wall, Savanta Comres have conducted another poll on the incoming Second Independence Referendum. Of course I mean "incoming" here in the loosest sense, like in "that asteroid, five million light years away, is definitely incoming". Their findings are pretty much the same as the weighted average of the five polls conducted in September. With Yes on 45% and No on 48%, we have hardly moved from where we were at the end of the summer. An earlier poll form Redfield and Wilton delivered a very similar result, close enough for me to use their crosstabs to make some points. But let's look at the trend first, and how it might have been influenced, or not, by events outwith of the Independence debate, or conspicuous lack thereof. The trendline might look good, because that's what trendlines are supposed to do with Excel, but the reality is that polls since the election are pretty much flatlining on 48-49% Yes and 51-52% No. Which is actually an astonishingly good result, when you factor in that the SNP have done fuck all for years to boost the Yes vote, as there are obviously more pressing matters to attend, like making crossdressing a legally protected characteristic.

The Redfield poll also shed some new light on the demographics of Independence, which are not exactly what we would expect them to be, based on earlier polls. 11% of Conservative voters voting Yes, and 18% of SNP voters voting No, is far higher in both cases than what we previously had. The downside is that they pretty much cancel each other out, and don't improve the overall result. The Yes vote among the younger generations is also lower than what we were used to, which might become an issue if the referendum is postponed until after Labour win a general election. Then there is one side of the issue that has never been polled, and it would probably be quite challenging to survey it: how many people do genuinely want independence, but not with the current variant of the SNP in government? I have a hunch there would be quite a lot. Just think of it and you will find three dozen reasons why, and their gender ideology obsession might not even be the strongest.

Finally, Redfield also polled the electorate's views on the timing of the referendum, the franchise and the conditions to be fulfilled. Here too, the results are not always what you might expect. The survey of the timing is self-explanatory. The question about the franchise refers to including anyone who lives in Scotland, which is the current definition. Or extending it to the Scottish-born living elsewhere in the UK, which is kind of the ethnocentric definition supported by some in the Yes movement. Finally the two questions about the conditions refer first to the infamous 60% threshold in polls, on which John Mason and Alister Jack agree, and was once also supported by Nicola Sturgeon. And finally to the choice between the proverbial Section 30 Order or a more radical way to trigger the referendum.

First, it appears that the public at large are not as keen on having an early referendum as earlier polls predicted, or as the Yes camp believe. Massive support from SNP voters means little here, as any scenario would first require a clear strategy from the SNP, which is conspicuous only by its absence right now. The answers about the franchise are quite ambiguous and possibly contradictory. I fail to see the upside of an "ethnic franchise", and quite a few downsides, even without considering the ethical considerations. I have a hunch that the ones supporting it will regret having opened that can of worms, if it ever becomes a serious debate in the run up to an actual referendum. Which is just a distant prospect anyway if we have to wait until five dozen of successive polls show Yes on 60%. The constitutional issue is also quite irrelevant right now, as nobody has yet defined a path to IndyRef that would not involve a Section 30 Order. Besides, if such a path was ever proposed, be sure the English Government would challenge it in court, and most likely win their case. Which would make the point moot and take us back to the beginning. Not much hope here, innit?

Sometimes the only choices you have are bad ones, but you still have to choose

(The Doctor, Doctor Who: Mummy On The Orient Express, 2014)

You can’t really tell something is an addiction until you try and give it up

(The Doctor, Doctor Who: Mummy On The Orient Express, 2014)

Let's have a quick look now at what has been happening abroad, in Germany. A word first about the German electoral law. If you think the Scottish Additional Members System is complicated, then you will love the German Mixed Membership System. Constitutionally, the Bundestag has 598 members, 299 elected by FPTP in constituencies, and 299 elected by PR on regional lists with a 5% threshold. Only it doesn't work quite that way as the German constitution requires that the number of seats for each eligible party must be proportional to their national share of the list vote. For many years, the system included overhang seats (Überhangmandate). It means that, if a party got more constituencies in a given state than its list share of the vote allowed, they would keep these seats but their lists seats would be reallocated to the other parties to secure full proportionality. But it did not achieve perfect proportionality, as perfection implied that the party benefiting from the overhang seats would have to be allocated a negative number of list seats. Since this obviously couldn't happen, a small distortion of proportionality had to be accepted, favouring the two largest parties, the CDU-CSU and the SPD. It amounted to a combined bonus of 24 seats for them in 2009, when the mechanism was first challenged in court, but no change was made in time for the 2013 election, where the overhang bonus rose to a combined 33 seats. A corrective mechanism was enforced for the 2017 election, with the allocation of leveling seats at national level, after all the statewide counts and allocations of overhang seats are done. The net effect was to delay the official results by several days, and increase the size of the Bundestag to a massive and unprecedented 709 members, 19% above the constitutionally mandated number. And here is what this convoluted system has delivered at the last four elections.

I have chosen 2005 as the staring point, as it is the year when Angela Merkel became Chancellor, the start of an era that ended with the September election. I will not give all the details of the German political parties' ideologies, as it would take too long and you have it all on Wikipedia. It actually pretty much matches the British political spectrum, with the addition of a radical left party (Die Linke), that has roots in the former East Germany and its long-gone Communist Party. The major difference is that the electoral law gives a lot more weight to the smaller parties, and this has generated government coalitions after almost every election since 1949, without any exception during the Merkel era, due to increased fragmentation of the popular vote that started already in the late 1980s. The Merkel era is exceptional in German post-war history because she governed, for three of her four terms, with support from a Grand Coalition (CDU-CSU and SPD), something that had happened only once before since 1949. She led a more traditional and often-seen-before coalition between the CDU-CSU and the FDP during her second term, which abruptly ended when the FDP failed to clear the 5% threshold and lost all their MPs in 2013. Merkel could have then gambled on a minority government as the CDU-CSU was just five seats short of a majority, but this is not part of Germany's political DNA, so she chose the Grand Coalition again. 2017 could have been the spectacular odd one out, as Merkel first tried an unprecedented coalition between the CDU-CSU, the FDP and the Greens. It fell through because of irreconcilable differences between the FDP and the Greens over energy and immigration, while Merkel was true to her ruthless pragmatism and ready to compromise. Then another Grand Coalition was the only mathematically feasible fall-back option. And now the results of the last election have definitely signalled a major shift, with the CDU-CSU bagging their worst result ever, and the SPD becoming the first party again after twenty odd years as second.

Angela Merkel did not genuinely anoint the CDU's Armin Laschet as her heir, and quite possibly she is not unhappy with the SPD's Olaf Scholz, who was her Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister for the whole of her last term, most likely being the next Chancellor. What would happen next was at first anybody's guess. The only certainty was another coalition, but it was expected to take time before knowing exactly which. Negotiations after the 2017 election lasted until 7 February 2018, and Merkel was not officially confirmed as Chancellor by the Bundestag until 14 March 2018, almost six months after the election. Coalitions in Germany usually receive nicknames based on the parties' official colours. So you have the Traffic Light Coalition (red-yellow-green as in SPD-Greens-FDP), and the Jamaica Coalition (black-yellow-green as in CDU-CSU-FDP-Greens) among the possible options. Far less likely are the Germany Coalition (black-yellow-red as in CDU-CSU-FDP-SPD, named after the colours of the national flag). The as-yet-unnicknamed Rot-Grün-Rot coalition (red-green-red as in SPD-Greens-Die Linke) was a possibility in 2005 and 2013, but ruled out by the SPD because of Die Linke's "communist" past. The point is moot now, as Die Linke in freefall means Rot-Grün-Rot don't have a majority. The most likely outcome, in a clean break from the Merkel era, was always the Traffic Light Coalition, and now it looks like they're nearly there, with a tentative common government platform that includes lowering the voting age to 16. There might still be some interesting acrobatics on domestic policies, but no tectonic shift on foreign policy. Especially, don't expect any change in the German position about the EU's future relationship with UK. Not this time, Bozo, and probably not ever.

We used to think that, if we knew “one”, we knew “two”

Because one and one are two, but we are finding out that

We must learn a great deal more about “and”

(Arthur Eddington)

Jeremy's Den

01/11/2021

Which Side Are They On?

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